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Abstract: 
This  paper  generates  persistent  effects  of a  monetary  disturbance  in  the  context  of 
staggered price-setters.  Previous research has been restricted by the CES functional form 
to price-setting rules that are constant markups over marginal costs.  The present paper 
considers a translog form for preferences and an  input-output structure for production in 
the  context  of  a  dynamic  general  equilibrium  model  of  monopolistically  competitive 
staggered price-setters.  We derive a price-setting rule that is a function of milrginal cost 
and  also competitors'  prices. This  rule  better  captures  the  interaction  of  price-setters 
envisioned  in  Tajlor (1980) and  Blanchard  (1983)  in  their  early  work  on  staggered 
contracts.  The model  is  able to generate reasonable persistence, and  also confirms the 
conjecture of Taylor  and  Blanchard  that  increasing the  number of contracting  groups 
increases the degree of persistence. 1.  Introduction 
The real effects of monetary disturbances is  ii  perennial question, which recently has received re- 
newed attention. Several recent papers have worked to incorporate nominal rigidities into dynamic 
general equilibrium  models (including Ohanian and Stockman (1994), Cho and  Cooley (1995). 
King and 'Watson (1995), Woodford (1996), and Yun  (1996)).  These models easily can generate 
real effects of monetary shocks, but they have difficulty in  generating persistence of these effects 
beyond the exogenously imposed rigidity. Such endogenous persistence is an esse:ntial feature of 
the data to replicate.' 
This issue of persistence has been explored previously in the context of staggered contracts. 
Taylor (1  980) showed that staggered wage contracts as short as one year could generate persistence 
similar to that observed in the data. Blanchard (1 983) showed a similar result in the case of firms that 
set prices in a staggered fashion. The underlying intuition is as follows: when a firm sets its price, 
it  is influenced by the prices set by other firms with which it must compete.  Under staggering, a 
price-setter ~vill  not fully adjust its price to shocks, because the prices of some competing firms will 
still be fixed during part of the price-setters contract period. Taylor characterizes  this mechanism 
for wage setters: 
...  when considering relative wages, firms and unions must look both forward and backward 
in  time to see what other workers will be  paid during their own contract period.  In  effect, 
each contract is written relative to other contracts, and this causes shocks to be passed on 
from one contract to another -  a sort of "contract multiplier." 
Taylor and Blanchard also both speculated, but did not demonstrate, that the degree of per- 
sistence would be more extreme for cases in  which there were a larger number of overlapping 
price-setters. 
See Chr~stiano.  Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) for a discussion of facts that models of monetary policy transmission 
should replicate The price-setting rules of Taylor and Blanchard are ad hoc. however. and recent research has 
worked to derive price-setting rules for optimizing monopolistically-competitive firms. and then 
embed this in  a general equilibrium model.  Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996) here unable in 
such a framework to generate reasonable endogenous persktence. Individual prices are adjusted so 
that once the last contracting period is over, the aggregate price level has fully adjusted and all real 
effects of a monetary disturbance disappear. 
A limitation of the work to date is that the monopolistic competitors are assumed to face a 
demand with a1  constant elasticity of substitution form. This assumption dictates a price-setting rule 
in which price is a constant markup over marginal cost.  Price is nct set in  response to the prices 
of competitors. as Taylor and Blanchard had in  mind. As a result, when a monetary shock induces 
a rise in output. the rise in  labor costs induces firms to raise their goods price, and this precludes 
persistence. Given the restriction of a constant markup, the existing literature has sought a solution 
by focusing 011  the role of marginal cost. Dotsey, King and Wolman moderate the rise in marginal 
costs by assuming an implausibly high degree of labor supply elasticity.  Erceg (1997) moderates 
marginal costs by assuming wage stickiness. Kiley (1  997) considers shifts in demand composition, 
in addition to an infinite labor supply elastici~. 
The present paper moves away from the restrictive assumption of CES preferences for de- 
manders and considers as an alternative a translog functional form. The result is that the endogenous 
price-setting rule is not a simple markup over marginal cost, but rather is significimtly influenced 
by competitors' prices. This mechanism of staggered contracts is embedded in a dynamic model of 
imperfectly competitive firms. The production function incorporates an input output structure, as 
suggested in Basu (1995), in which firms use the output of other firms as inputs in their own produc- 
tion process. This structure introduces output prices as an important component of marginal costs faced by firms,  and is yet a further reason why the price-setting rule is influenced by competitors' 
prices. 
Results suggest this framework  can generate significant endogenous  persistence.  For the 
case of two overlapping contracts and reasonable parameters, nearly 40% of the initial impact of a 
monetary shock on output persists one year after the initial shock, the time at which all prices have 
been reset. Further, contrary to the findings of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (l996), the speculation 
of Taylor (1980) and Blanchard (1983) are c:onfirmed, that increasing the number of contracting 
groups somewhat increases the degree of persistence. 
The next section presents the balsic twlo-group model, highlighting the use of translog pref- 
erences and the implications for the price-setting rule. Section three presents results. Section four 
extends the model to consider larger numbers of staggered groups. 
2.  The Model 
2.1  Consumer's Problem 
The consumer will allocate income intlxtemporally to maximize utility, defined over the consump- 
tion of differentiated products, real balances, and leisure: 
where ut is the sub-utility obtained from consumption of the differentiated products, Mt is money 
balances. Pt is an aggregate price index, and Lt is labor. The parameter (T will equal the inverse of 
the labor supply elasticity. Since the work of Dixit and Stiglitz  (1 977), a common choice for the sub-utility function de- 
fined over the differentiated products has been the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form.2 
Despite its tractability this functional form has serious drawbacks for the analysis of firms'  pric- 
ing. Since optimal prices are a constant markup over marginal costs, this means that the reaction 
functions of firms are completely independent of their competitors' prices. In the illustration used 
in oligopoly models, reaction functions become perfectly horizontal or vertical in price-space, so 
there is no strategic interaction between the firms. 
This special feature of the CES need not carry over to other choices of the sub-utility function. 
We  will consider a sub-utility function defined by the dual expenditure function, which is assumed 
to have a translog form. That is, given nominal expenditure Et,  the sub-utility from consumption 
of the diEerentiated products 1,  ...,  N is ut = Et/e(pt),  where the unit-expenditure. function e(pt)  is 
defined by: 
.  N  1%' 
with Q,,  = v,,.  In order for this function to be homogeneous of degree one, w,  need to impose the 
conditions: 
'V 
ni = 1  and C o =x  Oij = 0 
'3 
We can diifferentiate the unit-expenditure function to obtain the expenditure shares sZt  = 8  In et/8  lnpZt, 
While (2), (3): and (4) are the general case of the translog function, we can consider a special case 
The general class considered by  Dixit and Stiglitz is a sub-utility function that is additively separable over the differ- 
entiated products. If we also impose symmetry over consumption of each differentiated product. and homotheticity, then 
the only a.dditively separable function satisfying these properties is the CES. where all goods enter symmetrically.  In that c,ase,  the parameters become, 
1  '  forjfi  cr, = - o,, = -9, and qZJ  = -  S'  1V -  1 
2.2  Single-Period Firm Problem 
To  illustrate the usefulness of the translog functional form, we first consider a single-period problem 
faced by firms, where there are not staggered multi-period contracts. Denoting the marginal cost 
faced by the firm by ct and the demand for product i as rc,t, the firm problem may be stated: 
The (positive) elasticity of demand facing the firm  for its differentiated product is computed as 
31n E  7lLt=1---  -  4  ,41nFf -  1 - c,  where o,, < 0  is needed to ensure that demand is elastic. The first 
order condition then may be written: 
The expenditur~s  share can be substituted from (4).  and (7) could be solved for the optimal price, 
in  terms of marginal cost and the prices of competitors.  This expression is nonlinear (involving 
pzt and In  pZt). so we will take an approximation to allow us to obtain a simple solution for the 
price. Taking logs of both sides of (7), using ln(1 - 2)  =  (which is valid for sTt  small), and 
substituting for s,t  from condition (4)  we obtaxn, Or if we impose symmetry conditions (5): 
Thus, an increase in marginal costs of 1% will increase the optimal price by 0.5%. This "pass 
through" coeficient of 0.5 is a feature of the translog demand equations. Empirically, this is not an 
unreasonable value for the response of price to a change in costs, while holding competitors prices 
~onstant.~  Notice also that a rise in all the prices pjt, j  #  i by 1%  will also increase the optimal 
price p,t bly  0.5%,  so that the pricing equation is homogeneous of degree one in marginal costs and 
all competitor's prices. 
2.3  Multi-Period Firm Problem 
Now we will consider the general case in  which firms set their price for T periods.  In addition. 
we will suppose that the translog aggregate of the differentiated products serves as both the final 
consumer good, and as an input into the production function of each firm producing a differentiated 
product. The aggregate is combined with labor in a Cobb-Douglas production function. The mar- 
ginal costs of production are denoted by ct = IL~P:-~,  where wt is the nominal wage paid to labor, 
and Pt = e(pt)  is the aggregate price index.  The profit-maximization problem for an individual 
firm is: 
where the demand for product i,  xi,,  includes both consumption from consumers, which equals 
.si,E,/pit,  and demand from firms who use the differentiated products as intermediate inputs. Be- 
The literature on exchange rate pass-through is useful here. See for example Hooper and Mann (1989), which find a 
pass-through coeffkient in the range of 50-6OY~  for U.S.  importers of manufactures. Khosla (1991) finds a pass-through 
of 4394 for Japanese data. See Moffet (1988) for a summary of other studies with estimates around 50%. cause (1-0) of costs are devoted to purchases of intermediates, the firms' demand for each input is 
,st, (1 -  0')  ETc,/Pt. where we multiply revenue Et by the ratio of marginal cost to price to obtain 
total costs.  In calculating the elasticity of demand we treat Et as constant, and also suppose that 
the firm ignored the impact of its own price 'on the aggregate price index Pt  (which is reasonable 
if the number of products is large). Assuming symmetry (5) and using again the demand elasticity 
a  the first-order condition for the firm's problem may be written:  ?lit = 1 + s,t, 
To express this in a more convenient form, we use the approximations: 
The first approximation  holds if (y  + 11) (2)  is close to unity, meaning that the first-order 
condition (7) for choosing price optimally for each single period is not too far from holding; in 
other words, we are assuming that the costs and demand conditions are not changing much over the 
T periods. The second approximation in (12) is valid for s,t  small. Substituting (12) and (4) into 
(1 l), we can express the optimal price as: 
Note that if we were to set T = 1, we indeed would find the same pricing rule (9) found previously 
for the single-period problem. 
To gain some intuition into overlapping price setting, we will now focus on the two-period 
case.  We  will suppose that there are two groups of firm who set their prices in an overlapping 
fashion.  Firms i = 1. .  .  .  ,  N/2  choose their price in  period t,  where t is an odd number, and this price is then fixed for periods t and t +  1. Let us denote this price by pit, which is assumed to be 
the same for these firms. Similarly, the firms j = (Ar/2) + 1,  ...,  :V  choose their price pzt  in even 
periods t.  which is then fixed fort  and t +  1. We  apply expression (13) for all firms i = 1, ...,  1Y/2 
choosing the1 r price plt, and use pit  in place of pZt,  for I  = 1, .  .  ., N/2, and pzt  in place of pJt for 
j = (N/:!)  + 1, ...,  N.  Then assuming that iV is large, we can solve for plt as: 
Of course:, an analogous expression holds for p2t+l, chosen when t +  1 is even: 
In both of these expressions, the marginal costs are: 
where the aplproximation holds provided that the prices ylt and ppt  do not differ too much from 
each other. 
Notice that in (14), the optimal choice for pl+  will depend on the predetermined value of pzt 
(both directly and through marginal costs) and also on the future value of p2t+l.  The latter price 
depends on both plt+l = plt (chosen in the previous period) and plt+2. Thus, we can solve for plt 
by substituting (1  5) and (16) into (141, to obtain the forward looking expression: 
As an example, consider the case where 0=1. so that the differentiated products are not used as intermediate inputs. In  that case, (17) reduces to: 
This means that (6/35)=0.17 of the weight in  the pricing equation is given to pnt.  which is pre- 
determined, and  (1/35)=0.03  of the weight is given  to the future  price plt+2.  The remaining 
(12+14+2)/35=0.80 of the weight is given to wages, which are flexible.  These conditions will 
lead to a substantial flexibility in prices pit, due to the large influence of wages. In contrast, sup- 
pose that marginal costs are heavily determined by the price of intermediates, so that we choose 8 
rather small. In  that case. the weight on wages becomes correspondingly small (approaching zero 
as 0 does), while the weight on the price pzt becomes large, reaching a maximum value of 213. This 
would indicate a large potential degree of price stickiness, as the firms choosing their prices are 
heavily influenced by those prices that are predetermined. 
Another .way to evaluate the pricing equation (1 7) is to compare it to that obtained when the 
demand for the differentiated product is obtained from a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
function, which is the case assumed previously  in the literature. In that case the pricing rule would 
be: 
Price is set as a constant markup over marginal cost, with no role played by the price set by com- 
petitors.  Previous papers have displayed a pricing function that looks very similar to our pricing 
rule (14), which apparently allows competitors'  prices to affect price setting. Such a presentation 
is somewhat misleading, however, because the nominal  price in these instances is specified as a 
hnction of the real marginal cost, not the nominal, as in (14).  As a result the nominal price must be deflated by the price index, which is an average ober the prices set  by the two groups.  This 
indirectly introduces competitors'  prices into the equation.  But this role for competitors prices is 
very limited as. well as indirect, and clearly does not reflect the motivation for staggered contracts 
in Taylor (1980) and Blanchard (1983).' 
An equa.tion analogous equation to (19) holds for p2t+l  in  the CES case, and the marginal 
costs in (16) still apply. Combining these three equations, we obtain a forward-looking expression 
for plt: 
q-0) 
+ (&)  + [(h)  + w]  1"  ut+i + 2(l+e)i n wt+2 
The weigh1 given to the predetermined prices p2t  in this pricing equation is in general smaller than 
that given lo p:,, in  (1  7). An extreme example is provided when differentiated  intermediate inputs 
are not used at all (0 = 1). in which case the predetermined prices  receive zero weight, while 
current and future wages each receive weights of 0.5. This helps explain why previous papers have 
had limited1 success in generating endogenous persistence with staggered price setting. 
2.4  Equilibrium Conditions 
Into  (I) we substitute ut  = Et/e(pt)  as the sub-utility from consuming differentiated products, 
where Et  is nominal expenditure and Pt = e(pt)  is the price index. Then the consumer's  problem 
is to choose El,  Aft,  Lt and nominal bonds Bt to maximize: 
"t  should be noted that while Chari. Kehoe and McGrattan focus on a CES form for demand, they do also briefly 
consider a Stone-Geary functional form. subject to the budget constraint: 
where it is the nominal interest rate on bonds, and TIt is profits received from the firms producing 




-  P (1 +  it) 
Combining (23) and (24), we obtain E:t/Et-l = d [I + (Et/iZft)],  which is a difference 
equation in Et.  The only stable solution for Et (i.e. that does not approach zero or infinity) is: 
Therefore, in  response to an unanticipated  1%  increase in the nominal money supply, nominal ex- 
penditure Et will increase permanently by exactly 1%. 
The response of the nominal wage ult can be obtained from labor supply (25),  in conjunction 
with labor demand.  A simple way to obtain labor demand is to note that 6 percent of total costs 
go to pay labor, so that wtLt = BEtct/Pt where we have multiplied total revenue by the ratio of 
marginal costs to price to obtain costs.  Using ct  = IL~P,'-' and Pt = e(pt),  we combine labor demand with supply to obtain the equilibrium real wage:" 
Note that In Et -  In e (pt)  = In u.t, where ut  is the sub-utility from consumption, which we shall 
use as a measure of real final output in the economy. Then (27) shows that the elasticity of the real 
wage with respect to output exceeds unity.  The equilibrium conditions in the economy are (23), 
(24), (27) and the pricing equation (1 7) or (20). All equations are used in log-linearized form, and 
the model is solved as a perfect foresight equilibrium except for the initial period. 
We  calibrate the model as follows.  We  set the labor supply elasticity  110, to unity.  this is 
the value most supported by empirical evidence. Previous studies have been able to achieve some 
endogenous persistence only by assuming very elastic labor supply, which is contrary to the body 
of empirical evidence. ,8 will be set to 0.96. As discussed earlier, the benchmark case will set the 
share of inputs in  marginal cost, 8, at the value of 0.2 suggested by Basu(1995)., although other 
values will also be considered in sensitivity analysis below. 
3.  Results 
The experiment we consider is a permanent shock raising money supply one percent. We  consider 
two price-setting groups and we will regard each period of the model as half a year, so that one year 
after the monetary shock both groups will have reset their prices. 
Consider first a benchmark case in which preferences are CES and there is no input-output 
structure.  Figure la  shows the impulse response of real final output, in percent changes from the 
We  ignomre an inessential constant in this equation initial value.  The figure shows that output rises  1  percent  initially  as a result  of the monetary 
expansion. But there is no endogenous persistence. One year after the shock, when1 both groups of 
firms have been able to adjust their goods prices, output is below its long-run level. This replicates 
the findings of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan ( 1996). Figure 1 b helps explain the re:sult. The rise in 
output require:; a large increase in labor input, in turn causing the wage rate to rise significantly. This 
rise in marginal costs induces firms to raise their price significantly when given the opportunity. In 
the first period after the shock, the price-setter raises his price in excess of the 1  percent money 
supply increase, so the aggregate price rises 0.58 percent. In the second period, once both groups 
have reset prices, aggregate prices are above their long-run level. 
Som~e  intuition into this result can be gained  by solving the model analytically (following 
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 1996).  Beginning with the CES pricing rule (14),  substituting for 
wage with (27 ),  substituting out expenditure from the linearized form of (26), and writing the ag- 
gregate price index as the average of the two goods prices, we may write: 
where pt  is the optimal goods price set in  period t,  and nzt is money, both in log deviations. Also 
note that in  the above: 
Assuming il  random walk process for money, a solution may be written for pt: where: 
The variable, nCES, may be interpreted as an index of persistence, as (30) implies the following, 
where we write yt for the log of real final output: 
So aC~s  represents the persistence of output deviations after the second period, when all price 
setters have had a chance to reset their  This formulation is identical to that of Chari, Kehoe 
and McGrattan (1  996) and Kiley (1997), except that y  is a function of the deep parameters particular 
to our model. 
To  find persistence, we need ac~s  > 0 or equivalently -, < 1.  But in the pure CES case 
with no input-output structure (0 = 1). it  is true that 2  = 1 + a,  which is always greater than 
one. Under these assumptions there can never be positive persistence. This case is identical to that 
analyzed  by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996), and we confirm their finding. A high value of 
labor substitutability (0  low) raises the degree of persistence, but even an infinite elasticity (a  = 0) 
is not sufficient to generate persistence that is positive. 
The introduction of translog preferences and input-output structure generates more persis- 
tence.  Setting the input-output parameter in  line with the estimates of Basu (1995) (8 = 0.2), 
figure 2a shows that output is significantly more persistent.  Output rises again  1  percent in the 
initial period of the monetary shock, and one year afterward, output is still 0.375 percent above 
normal. Figure 2b suggests that price rises much more gradually in this case. Price setting is now a 
Note thi3t this indicates the fraction of the previous period's output that persiststs, not the fraction of the intial impact 
two period previous, which would be a preferable indicator of persistence in the two-period case. function ofcornpetitors' prices, half of which are fixed in  any period. Figure 2b also suggests that 
nominal w,ages are rising much less; this is due to the fact that labor is no longer the major input in 
production. 
We  can solve the translog system analyiically as we did for the CES case. The solution is the 
same, except that the index of persistence is: 
Again for  persistence we need  QTL~~  >  0,  which  requires here that y <  2, a more generous 
restriction than in the CES case. This requires that: 
so that even under the assumption of a reasonable labor supply elasticity (rr = I),  the model always 
produces positive persistence, regardless of the degree of input-output structure (8  is restricted to 
the interval (0,  I)). 
What portion of this persistence  is due to the translog preferences and what portion to the 
input-output structure? Consider what happens to the CES case when we consider an input-output 
structure. Condition (3 1) suggests that the CES persistence index should be a negative function of 
the level of yarid hence 8. In particular, UCES > 0 when: 
So under our labor-supply assumption of (T = 1, positive persistence would require that labor costs 
account for less than 213  of marginal costs (8 < 213). Figure 3  graphs the output responses to 
a  1  percent  increase in money for various values of 0 in  the CES case.  The figure indeed shows positive persistence for H  = 0.5, and  it shows this persistence  increases as H  iBlls and the role 
of labor cosls decreases.  Condition (3  1) suggests that in the extreme case where labor plays no 
role in marginal cost (0 = O), then aC~s  = 1 and persistence would be complete, with real effects 
persisting indefinitely. Note also that there is a potential trade-off between the labor supply elasticity 
and the degree input-output structure. If we are willing to consider values of a less than unity, then 
persistence can be generated with less extreme values for 8. 
Consider next how various degrees of input-output structure affect the tran,slog case. Figure 
4 shows output responses for various values of 8.  When goods play no role as inputs (8 = I), 
output falls immediately to its long-run level one year after the shock. This suggests that the input- 
output structure is an important element of persistence here.  Nevertheless, this persistence still 
represents an improvement over the CES case, in  which output actually fell below its long-run 
level. Comparison of the impulse responses in figures 3 and 4 shows that for each of the values of 6 
considered, persistence is greater for the translog case. This is confirmed by comparing conditions 
(3  1 ) and (33 I, which implies that: 
for all 13. Further, the gap between the two cases is not constant. Over most of the range of 8, the 
additional benefit of using translog preferences grows as the role of input-output structure increases. 
Clearly both elements are important, and they appear to interact in  generating persistence.  This 
suggests that earlier research, which tended to consider only one element at a time, may have missed 
potential persistence generated by the interaction of multiple elements. 4.  Increased Number of Groups 
Finally, we wish to check the conjecture of Taylor and Blanchard that increasing the number of 
staggered groups would increase the degree of persistence. 
Begin with the general T-period firm optimization problem (I 0) and its firsit-order condition 
(13).  Suppose the N firms are divided into G equally-sized groups, indexed by g = l...G, with 
each group setting their prices for T = G periods in staggered fashion. The price-setting equation 
for any fiirm in group one would be (replacing equation (14)): 
The weight of all other price groups is now (G -  1)/(2G -  1).  which becomes larger with G, the 
number of groups.  In  other words, now a larger share of competitors are not in  one's own price- 
setting group, so a larger fraction of competitor prices are fixed in  the current period.  Using the 
analogous prnce setting rules for all groups, as well as the definition of costs and price index: 
we may vvrite a rather lengthy price-setting equation for any G, which corresponds to equation (I 7) 
for the two-group case. 
Figure 5 presents the impulse response to the experiment of a permanent one-percent increase 
in the money supply, in the context of various numbers of price-setting groups.  With four groups 
rather than two, the degree of persistence after one year increases from 0.375 percent to 0.413 
percent.  Twelve staggered groups increases persistence to 0.423 percent.  Figure 6 suggests the 
additional gains in  persistence from multiple groups is not as large as the contributions of input- output structure or translog preferences considered earlier.  Nevertheless, this result does confirm 
the conjecture of Taylor and Blanchard, which was not the case in other subsequent studies.  And 
it again points out the importance of interaction of model elements. Only in  a framework where 
competitors' prices matter in the pricing rule, is there an additional effect of having a larger share 
of competitors whose price is currently fixed. 
A CES functional form is severely limiting in  the context of monopolistically competitive price 
setters. It implies that the real price is set by firms as a constant markup over marginal costs, and is 
not affected by competitors' prices. This misses the interaction of price-setters envisioned in Taylor 
(1980) and Blanchard (1983) in their early work on staggered contracts. This paper has taken steps 
to move beyond the CES functional form and has consider the implications of a translog form for 
preferences.  It has also taken seriously the notion of Basu (1995), assigning a significant role for 
goods as inputs in the production process. These two affects contribute to a pricing-setting rule that 
gives significant weight to competitors'  prices.  The result is a reasonable amount of persistence 
beyond the period of exogenously-imposed  rigidity.  Further, once firms begin to care about the 
prices set by competitors, it is found that increasing the number of staggered price-setting groups 
increases the degree of endogenous persistence. 
The degree of persistence achieved in  the present model is reasonable, but does not fully 
match the degree Taylor generated using his ad hoc pricing rule, which he considered necessary to 
fully reflect features of the data. The translog form used here probably cannot deliver further per- 
sistence, at least not without implying a degree of pass-through of marginal costs inconsistent with empirical evidence. Further work will consider additional elements which may deYiver persistence. 
The present model has demonstrated also that the interaction of various elements can be important 
in  generating persistence, in a way not apparent when elements are considered indikidually. 
Future work will also extend the model to a two-country case. Persistence is a vital question 
in interna.tional macroeconomics, in particular in  explaining the comovement of real and nominal 
exchange rates. Further, we will explore our model's implications for the occurrence and effects of 
exchange rate overshooting. Finally, it is hoped that the translog specification developed here could 
augment the micro-foundations of dynamic models used for macroeconomic policy analysis.' 
See Svensson (1998) for an example of such a model with micro-foundations 
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